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Abstract

Over thirty years since the passage of the Clean Water Act, much of the nation's
rivers and streams fail to meet water quality standards. Pollution from nonpoint sources is
increasingly responsible for these failures. Existing regulatory approaches may not be
capable of meaningfully reducing water quality impairments due to their inability to
control emissions from nonpoint sources. Water quality trading may provide a cost
effective solution to many of the persistent water quality impairments caused by nutrients
and other oxygen demanding pollutants. However, trading will require the presence of
market participants - both buyers and sellers of pollution reduction credits- in order to
be successful. Thus, the first paper in this thesis analyzes Tennessee's watersheds to
determine which have the conditions necessary to support a successful water quality
trading market.
The second paper focuses on the reduction of pollution from nonpoint sources.
Specifically, it estimates the social costs associated with a mandatory riparian grassed
buffer strip for agricultural lands in the Harpeth River watershed in Middle Tennessee. In
addition, this paper approximates a supply curve for buffer strips in this watershed. This
latter result constitutes an important step towards understanding the supply of nutrient
emissions reduction credits. The next step would be to estimate the reduction in nutrient
runoff associated with these buffer strips.
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Chapter I
A Brief Introduction to Water Quality Problems and Solutions
Some History & Background
A fire on the surface of the Cuyahoga River on June 22, 1969 caught the attention
of American politicians and citizens alike. Fires began to plague the Cuyahoga River as
early as 1939, due to high levels of pollution from oil and grease (Greenhalgh and Faeth);
however, the fire of 1969 was the first to draw National attention, thanks to the initial
article published in Time Magazine's brand new Environment section, which graphically
described the Cuyahoga as "a river that oozes rather than flows. " Being contaminated by
substances such as oil, grease, untreated sewage and various industrial wastes, this river
was an extreme and very visible indicator of the types of water quality problems that
were pervasive during the time period, and its burning spurred legislators to action.
Shortly after the Cuyahoga came to national attention, the United States passed the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly known as the
Clean Water Act (CWA), to curb the effects of human activities on water quality.
The CWA is still in force in 2005. Among the goals listed in the CWA are the
"restor[ation] and maint[enance of] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters," the elimination of "the discharge of pollutants into navigable water . ..
by 1985," and the prohibition of the discharge of any "toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts." 1 The means specified in the act to aid in the attainment of the goals include a
1

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (a)l, & (a)3

1

permitting system, which came to be known as the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), to be administered by state agencies to regulate
_ point
source (PS) emissions (e.g., discharges through pipes or ditches) to the nation's waters
(US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water, 2001). The CWA also states that
the "national policy" is that measures be designed and implemented in a timely manner to
curb the nonpoint source (NPS) contribution (including agricultural land runoff and other
such diffuse sources) to pollutant loadings in waterways, though no specific means of
achieving this goal are laid out in the legislation.2 This "national policy" established by
Congress, though not explicit in methodology, recognizes the need for a combination of
PS and NPS pollutant load reductions to meet the ambient water quality goals proposed
by the CWA.

Point Source Issues
As required by the CWA, all PSs must have an NPDES permit to continue legally
discharging into U.S. waterways (US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water,
2001). These permits place strict limits on the quantity of pollutants or the allowable
concentration in polluters' effluents, and are normally based on available technology,
except in instances where technology-based standards are insufficient to attain applicable
water quality standards (Ryan). Technology-based standards have not been fruitless in
bringing about decreases in the level of pollutant discharges. Many case studies, such as
that of the Blue Plains Treatment Plant discharging into the Potomac Estuary, have
shown improved water quality as a direct result of implementation of treatment plant
2 33 U.S.C. § 125l(a)7

upgrades, and monitoring data at several hundred measurement stations throughout the
nation have shown estimated 23% reductions in pollutants such as phosphorous and fecal
.
.
.
bacteria between 1974 and 1981 (Knopman and Smith). However, such improvements
have not been without cost; between 1974 and 1994, federal and state/local governments
invested $96 billion and $117 billion, respectively, in new and upgraded municipal
wastewater treatment plants to meet standards imposed by NPDES permitting
(Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies and the Water Environment
Federation). Yet, implementation of the water treatment standards for PSs has not
completely achieved the goals of the CWA. It has, on the other hand, substantially
depleted the range of cost-effective options remaining for the control of PS discharges.
Estimates from US EPA and AMSA put the funding needs of municipal treatment works
over the next 20 years at approximately $139.5 billion and $330 billion, respectively, to
fill currently unmet needs for water infrastructure nationwide (Association of
Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies and the Water Environment Federation). Though these
cost estimates vary widely, they are indicative of the great expense of improving water
quality through regulation of PS polluters alone.

Nonpoint Source Reductions: A More Cost-Effective Way?

The good news is that it is not necessary to attain ambient-based water quality
standards solely through increasingly strict PS regulation. Frequently, PS and NPS
polluters emit the same or similar pollutants. NPS pollution from agriculture, in contrast

3

to PS pollution, does not require permitting and is not regulated by law, except in a few
instances.
Several trends have caused NPS pollution of the nation's waterways to become a
quantitatively greater contributing factor to water quality impairments than point source
emissions (US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water, 2002). Population
increase, for example, has promoted expansion of urban development as well as more
intensive agricultural practices to meet the increasing food needs of a growing American
public. NPS runoff is a national issue. In fact, when the states and territories performed
a recent survey of the nation's waters, they found that 39% of the waters assessed were
impaired for one or more uses, and EPA posits that the largest single contributor to water
quality impairment is NPS runoff from agricultural lands (US Environmental Protection
Agency Office of Water, 2002).
Since agricultural runoff is typically not regulated or monitored, adoption of best
management practices (BMPs), which reduce soil erosion and runoff of wastes, among
NPS polluters has, for the most part, been voluntary. Because of the voluntary nature of
pollution abatement in the agricultural sector and 30 years of increasingly strict PS
regulation, there is reason to suppose that a cost differential may exist between PSs and
NPSs with regard to abating pollutants common to both groups, with NPS reductions
being the less costly route for society as a whole. Because reduction of agricultural
runoff has not traditionally been mandated by law, many relatively inexpensive options
for pollution control may still remain for most agricultural producers; however,
enforcement and monitoring of any pollution control standards for agriculture could be a
4

costly administrative problem due to the sheer number of individuals involved in the
creation of NPS pollution (Russell and Clark). The question, then, is whether a policy
instrument exists that can assist in achieving scientifically predetermined pollutant
reductions in a cost-effective manner.

Water Quality Trading: Is this the Policy Instrument We Seek?

One method that could potentially reduce total abatement costs by taking
advantage of the cost differential between PS and NPS polluters who emit the same
contaminants is known as water quality trading (WQT), which is a market-based
approach to pollution control in which one polluter can purchase a marketable emissions
permit from another. The purchaser can increase emissions by the amount specified in
the permit, while the seller must decrease emissions by an equivalent amount. Absent
transactions costs or other market imperfections, trading would theoretically occur until
the marginal abatement costs for all polluters in the market were equalized, yet the total
emissions of the pollutant traded would not increase above limits designed to preserve or
restore ambient water quality. Emissions could be limited to levels consistent with the
goals of the CWA by restricting the number of government-issued permits.
As with any tradable permit market, a WQT market would need a market driver to
encourage economic activity. The CWA empowers EPA to establish a system of Total
Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), which could function as such a driver by making
additional pollution reduction necessary in areas where waters have been identified as not
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meeting ambient water quality standards even after technology-based controls.3 The
CWA sates that "[s]uch load shall be established at a level necessary to implement the
applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent
,
limitations and water quality;' 4 thus, the TMDL system is an ambient-based standard,
protecting water quality based on the amount of the pollutant the receiving water body
can assimilate, rather than the level to which PSs could "reasonably" be expected to
lower their emissions. EPA describes TMDLs as "pollutant budgets" in which the total
allowable discharge is allocated across PSs and NPSs in the area (US Environmental
Protection Agency Region 10). Assuming no transactions costs, once TMDLs are created
for areas and waste loads are allocated between sources, allowing entities to trade those
allocations amongst themselves would permit the sources to achieve the necessary
abatement at a lower cost.
Although many economists and policy-makers extol the savings potential of
marketable permit systems, acceptance has been slow in regard to WQT, and only limited
pilot programs are in place in the United States. EPA has expressed interest in and
support for WQT. EPA has formally endorsed WQT since 1996 in the Draft Framework
for Watershed-Based Trading (US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water,

1996). This document supports "offset" trading, rather than a watershed-based "cap and
trade" program. Under an offset program, a polluter under regulatory pressure to further
reduce emissions (such as a PS whose emissions cap has been lowered) has the option of
3
4

33 U.S.C. §1313(1)(A)
33 u.s.c. §1313(1)(C)

paying another polluter (a PS or NPS) to meet abatement requirements. In contrast, a cap
and trade system would require that tradable effluent permits be issued to all polluters in
a watershed, thus allocating specific abatement responsibilities to individual PSs and
NPSs, in accordance with the abatement required by applicable TMDLs, and then
allowing sources to buy and sell permits.

Overview of Subsequent Chapters

This chapter has presented a brief introduction to water quality issues in general,
and WQT as a potential part of the solution.
Chapter II is a review of the literature regarding tradable emissions rights and the
economic theory on which these systems are based. Also included in chapter II is a
discussion of policy concerns, as well as operational programs that allow trading of
discharge responsibilities between polluters.
Chapter III develops a methodology for comparing distinct watershed areas based
on their suitability for WQT as determined by various factors, including location of PS
and NPS polluters with respect to water quality impairments, and the extent of the
impairments to which they contribute.
Chapter IV describes a methodology for plotting some approximation of a supply
curve for agricultural riparian buffers, which is a BMP that aids in the reduction of
nutrient pollution in agricultural runoff. With some extensive water quality modeling,
this process could be expanded to approximate a supply curve for NPS nutrient
reductions.
7

Chapter V is a summary that includes some overall conclusory remarks with
regard to the aforementi�ned chapters.

8

Chapter II
A Review of the Literature

Introduction

This chapter will provide a review of literature related to tradable emissions rights
and WQT specifically. Herein, some of the theory behind trading of discharges is
reviewed, a few issues of program design are discussed, and some notable WQT
programs and their successes are summarized.

The Conceptual Basis for Trading Pollution Allowances

According to Coase ( 1960), property rights (not just property itself) may be
appropriately viewed as factors of production. He effectively shows that market
transactions can (absent transactions costs) optimally allocate the use of resources
between two economic agents that reciprocally harm one another (i.e., one operator must
incur some cost in order to avoid imposing some cost on the other). In such a case the
owners of the two enterprises may enter into bilateral negotiations to achieve socially
optimal use of their combined resources. Such negotiations are relatively cost free when
few economic agents are involved; however, in the instance of a factory that produces
smoke, Coase hypothesizes that transactions costs would be prohibitively high due to the
vast number and diversity of individuals and organizations adversely affected. High
transactions costs would, in tum, bring about a suboptimal allocation of resources since
they would prevent some negotiations from proceeding. In such cases, Coase suggests
9

government regulation may be preferable to negotiations because it has the potential to
effectuate reductions in discharges even when socially beneficial trades would be
precluded by transactions costs; however, such regulation may come at high
administrative costs to government as well as great control costs to polluters.
Furthermore, since allowable pollutant discharges would be determined by the
government to protect environmental quality based on imperfect data, rather than through
negotiations between the polluter and all adversely affected groups, there is no reason to
believe that social welfare would be optimized. Thus, due to the existence of transactions
costs (or administrative costs) and imperfect information, socially optimal solutions may
be unattainable in regional and global pollution control problems.
Hung and Shaw note that, in the case of pollution, social efficiency (optimality) is
an impractical standard because it poses a heavy information burden for the regulatory
agency. They state that in the case of pollution control, the standard of cost
effectiveness, or meeting a regulatory environmental standard at least cost, is the
generally accepted policy goal for economists. WQT is a hybrid system. It includes
elements of government regulation, which causes polluters to reciprocally harm each
other by limiting aggregate use of water for the discharge of residuals. The system also
includes bilateral negotiations between these parties that are reciprocally harmful to one
another, thus reducing transactions costs by reducing the number of entities involved in
the negotiation process.

10

Issues of Program Design for WQT
Hung and Shaw's study proposes a trading system based on predetermined
trading ratios to minimize transactions costs. Under this type of system, a watershed
would be divided into zones in which the discharge of one �it of a pollutant would have
·approximately the same environmental impact. Each zone would have a maximum
discharge cap imposed by quotas that could be traded at a ratio of 1: 1 within the zone.
The inter-zone trading ratios would be determined by the rate at which the pollutant is
transferred from one zone to another, and would be published by the regulating agency to
improve information and reduce transactions costs. As an added benefit, the zonal
system would eliminate incentives for an upstream polluter to purchase reductions from a
downstream polluter, as downstream reduction would not affect upstream loadings. The
elimination of this incentive could reduce the potential for inter-zone pollution hotspots;
however, intra-zone trading could cause the occurrence of hot spots within individual
zones, unless zones were very small so that the environmental impacts within the zone
were approximately equal. This begs the question: How equal is "approximately equal"?
Or, how small would the zones have to be? If the regulatory agency bears the cost of
information provision to reduce transactions costs, a trade-off between administrative and
transactions costs becomes evident as the _number of zones multiplies.
While Hung and Shaw's design is specific to PSs, the authors state that it could be
expanded to include NPS polluters as well. Allowing trading between NPS and PS
polluters, many economists agree, may provide the greatest potential for abatement cost
savings (Horan and Shortle, Faeth); however, this introduces the issue ofNPS:PS trading
11

ratios. There is an extensive literature discussing such ratios, as well as their purposes
and effects. Horan and Shortle, for example, note that risk is often the major focus of
debate concerning trading ratios, and that the uncertain effectiveness of NPS control
methods (i.e. NPS control is less dependable, or more risky) is often used as a
justification for setting ratios at levels greater than unity in existing programs. However,
they posit that this logic only accounts for part of the risk, as NPS pollution, which is
dependent on weather events and input use, is extremely stochastic in the first place; thus,
controlling NPS pollution may create a greater stability in pollution levels, reducing the
risk of high pollutant loadings during adverse weather events. They propose that the real
reason for trading ratios above unity is the current regulatory system, under which
agricultural NPS polluters have been effectively granted the right to pollute. In existing
trading programs of the offset type endorsed by EPA, only PS polluters are monitored
and regulated by the NPDES permitting program. If trading program authorities could
allocate permits to all sources (including agricultural NPS polluters), then NPS:PS
trading ratios less than one would be acceptable because this would encourage greater
abatement of risky, stochastic NPS pollution.
Woodward points out that, while the most obvious purpose of trading ratios is that
of equating the impacts of different polluters to insure that an increase in emissions by
one is at least offset by the other, there are other reasons for employing trading ratios.
Many trading programs seek to use trading ratios to provide a net environmental benefit,
in addition to an offset credit and a margin of safety to account for uncertain reduction
methods (McGinnis). While economists tend to attack the pollution reduction problem as
12

a cost minimization problem (minimizing the cost of meeting an environmental quality
standard), Woodward suggests politicians and other policy makers tend to view the
problem from the dual perspective - maximizing environmental quality subject to some
cost constraint that is politically acceptable. Thus, regulators and environmentalists may
favor use of trading ratios for their potential to create environmental gains beyond the
requirements of the ambient water quality standards. However, Woodward points out
that while the cost minimization perspective completely discounts the value of pollution
reductions below the regulatory standard (which does not necessarily reflect public
opinion about such reductions), the environmental quality maximization problem ignores
the market inefficiencies introduced by non-unitary trading ratios.
Stephenson and Shabman present a system similar to WQT known as a discharger
association. This type of program design has been implemented in the Tar-Pamlico and
Neuse River Basins in North Carolina. The discharger association is a group of firms
which have a collective abatement responsibility assigned by a regulatory agency, but the
member firms are allowed to allocate the total responsibility among themselves to
achieve the allowable discharge level at the lowest possible cost. Using this particular
organizational structure to achieve environmental standards may reduce transactions
costs, thus allowing a more cost-effective final distribution of abatement responsibilities
among the member firms. The concept of discharger associations harkens back to
Coase's "The Nature of the Firm," (1937) wherein he posits that firms exist because it is
sometimes more cost-effective to coordinate economic activities within one organization
than it is to deal with transactions costs in the market place. The problem with this
13

particular organizational form, at least for pollution control, is that it does not seem to
account for the geospatially differential impacts of member firms through any mechanism
such as a trading ratio.
Another issue for WQT program design is how to trade NPS loadings for PS
emissions, given NPS loadings cannot be regularly or accurately measured. Since NPS
reduction credits for most BMPs can only be estimated based on modeling, a large
amount of information about land use and agricultural practices surrounding proposed
BMPs will be required to accurately predict the reduction produced by the
implementation of a given BMP. For example, if an agricultural producer is using a
responsible nutrient management plan, installation of a riparian buffer strip on the same
land would not create the same load reduction that it would if the producer were to
liberally apply fertilizer up to the very edge of the buffer strip. A given BMP may be
worth more or less, in terms of nutrient reduction credits, depending on its interaction
with surrounding land uses and previously implemented BMPs.
A separate but related issue is the law of unintended consequences; installation of
one conservation practice may lead to unpredictable changes in production practices
elsewhere on the farm or on other farms, which may be either beneficial or deleterious to
environmental quality. Allowing farmers to make money by creating pollution reduction
credits may provide perverse incentives for farmers who have already implemented best
management practices. Some might even go so far as to farm land that they otherwise
would not, just so they could later offer to take the land out of production to create credits
for which they would be paid by a PS polluter. Establishing historical base loads for NPS
14

•
polluters based on historical land use patterns is one way to assuage the potential effects
of perverse incentives, so that runoff-reducing practices implemented prior to a base year
.

.

.

cannot create tradable credits, and must be maintained if the NPS polluter whishes to
create tradable credits after the base year. Another means that might decrease the effect
of perverse incentives for agricultural producers is to require that NPS polluters
contribute some water quality benefit before they can create any salable discharge credits.
Versions of both of these policies are included in the trading rules for the Lower Boise
River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project (Ross & Associates Environmental
Consulting, Ltd.).

Best Management Practices

Best management practices (BMPs) are practices designed to reduce NPS
loadings. This section will review the literature regarding the effectiveness and cost
effectiveness of a few BMPs that are often considered viable means of reducing the
nutrient content in agricultural runoff.
Lee, Isenhart and Schultz perfonned a study regarding the effectiveness of
riparian buffer strips in reducing runoff and nutrient content from com and soybeans in
Iowa. They measured nutrient load reductions effectuated by established multi-species
riparian buffers composed of switchgrass and switchgrass with woody plants. Such a
buffer can dam runoff up to 10 cm high. This slowing of the water permits greater time
for runoff to infiltrate the soil and for some nutrients and sediments to settle out of the
remaini1:1g runoff. Their results showed that the 23 foot switchgrass buffer removed 95%
15

•
of the sediment, 80% of the total nitrogen, and 78% of the total Phosphorous. Thus, th'e
authors show that an established, well-planned riparian buffer can effectively remove
much of the nutrient content of agricultural runoff.
Rein found that by establishing perennial vegetative buffer strips, strawberry
farmers in the Elkhorn Slough watershed of California could derive an estimated net
benefit of $ 1,488 in the first year and $6, 171 over a five year period. Benefits accrue
from reduced pesticide and fertilizer use and reduced gully erosion, as well as other
sources. These results suggest that farmers of certain crops on certain soils would be
better off establishing buffer strips than not; however, these results will not hold for all
watersheds and all crops.
Norwood and Chvosta found that BMPs do not always have their intended
consequences; in fact, they may sometimes have adverse effects on water quality. Their
findings are relevant to swine farms in two North Carolina counties, and are based on the
results of a survey of 85 producers regarding their likely manure-management practices
in the face of phosphorous-based manure application regulations. Manure contains a
higher phosphorous to nitrogen ratio than is required for plant growth, but because of the
cost and difficulty of transporting it, swine farmers tend to over-apply manure on
cropland or forage surrounding their operations. This leads to phosphorous buildup in the
soil and water quality problems caused by the associated runoff. The study found that
many hog producers would clear land adjacent to their existing operations so that they
would be able to apply based on phosphorous requirements of the soil and crop. This
being the case, more chemical nitrogen fertilizer would be required for the expanded
16

area, possibly leading to greater nitrogen loadings to surface waters, which could offset
the reductions in phosphorous loadings. Some respondents to the survey indicated they
.

.

.

would reduce the size of their herd or leave swine production altogether. The results of
the study indicate that water quality would be improved unambiguously only if hog
production decreased by 25% or more. Thus, the environmental improvements would be
due to decreased production, rather than the BMP itself. These results are not necessarily
applicable in all areas, but they show that regulation of farming practices can have
unintended and adverse consequences.

Some Notable WQT Programs

Several WQT programs have been established in the United States. Some are
considered successful, while others have not produced the expected results, at least in
terms of trading activity. Appropriate program design is crucial to the success of tradable
emissions permit systems; thus, in developing new projects, policy-makers should
consider what trading rules have previously proved to be conducive to trade. Two
exemplary WQT projects currently in some stage of implementation are the Tar-Pamlico
Nutrient Reduction Trading Program (TPNRT) and the Lower Boise River Effluent
Trading Demonstration Project (LBRET).

The Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Reduction Trading Program

The TPNRT Program in North Carolina was established in response to the 1989
designation of The Tar-Pamlico River Basin as nutrient sensitive waters, with the specific
17

purpose of reducing the over-nitrification of the Pamlico River Estuary (Environomics).
PSs in the market function as an association, and have the option of cooperative
abatement within the association or "trading" with NPSs (by contributing $56/kg/yr to a
government-operated BMP fund) to meet caps on nitrogen and phosphorous emissions
(McGinnis). The use of average NPS abatement costs in place of marginal costs to set
the ''price" of NPS credits likely eliminates some potential cost savings. However,
because the BMP funds are distributed to NPS polluters through a government agency,
the burden of transactions costs is at least partially lifted from both PSs and NPSs. The
PSs are thus disassociated from any uncertainty inherent in dealing with NPSs; if a PS
pays for its emissions above the cap it has no further responsibility. Such disassociation
between buyers and sellers could possibly lead to a situation in which PSs pay for NPS
emissions reductions that are simply not available (Environomics). As of 1999, however,
the PS association had been able to stay below its collective nutrient cap through "minor
capital improvements," "the addition of nutrient removal processes at two of the larger
plants," and what might be termed PS-PS "trading" (Environomics). Because the PS
association has been able to comply with its aggregate load allocation, there has been no
need for payments to the BMP fund to date; however, some very limited PS-NPS
"trading" has occurred through the purchase and banking for future use of NPS pollutant
reduction credits (Woodward and Kaiser, Environomics ).
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The Lower Boise River Ejjl.uent Trading Demonstration Project
The LBRET Demonstration Project, a program trading in total phosphorous
emissions,- was initiated in 1 997 by EPA, Idaho, Oregon and Washington as a pilot
program to examine "how trading can help improve water quality and lower the overall
cost of meeting pollutant reduction objectives required by [TMDL] processes" (Ross &
Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd.).
Both PS and NPS polluters in the Lower Boise River can create marketable
reduction credits; however, one might argue that the market rules discourage some of the
most potentially beneficial trades, namely PS-NPS trades. For example, trades involving
NPS polluters must provide a water quality contribution, which is to say that "only part of
the [NPS] reduction can be available for sale . . . since the sold portion could be offset by
a point source increase" (Ross & Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd.). Thus,
agricultural producers must abate significantly more than they can sell as certifiable
credits. The required water quality contribution may be enough to discourage PS-NPS
trades, especially along with the transaction costs associated with trading. A further
stipulation of the program guidelines is that "[ n]onpoint credits will be transferable only
after the project is installed, installation has been inspected . . . and the reductions have
been verified through monitoring and established by submitting the Reduction Credit

Certificate" (Ross & Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd.). Potential participants
would not likely want to pay in advance for the installation of a BMP only to find that the
practice did not create the estimated reduction credit along with the required water
quality contribution. On the other hand, the year for calculating the baseline pollutant
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loadings for NPSs in the lower Boise is 1996, so any BMP installed between 1996 and
the present may generate salable credits (Idaho Department of Environmental Quality,
2004). Yet, NPS reductions that are calculated based on models, rather than directly
measured, are reduced in value by an uncertainty discount multiplier to account for the
variability in effectiveness of the BMP (Ross & Associates Environmental Consulting,
Ltd.). Such program rules regarding NPSs may be the primary reason for the lack of
trading activity in the Lower Boise River, as they reduce the cost-efficiency that could be
gained through PS-NPS trading. The v�lue of each of these restrictions could be argued
based on criteria such as equity (i.e., PSs should not be responsible for all reduction,
hence the required NPS water quality contribution) and water quality protection;
however, their combinatory effect may be prohibitive to PS-NPS trading. According to
Craig Shepard, of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, no trades have been
completed in the program area to date (Personal communication December 9, 2005),
despite the development of a TMDL for Snake River-Hells Canyon in 2002, which had
been anticipated as the primary market driver for this WQT market (Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality).
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Chapter III
An Assessment of Potential Water Quality Trading Markets in Tennessee

Introduction

Working within the current regulatory structure of the CW A, offset trading,
wherein PSs under regulatory pressure to reduce discharges purchase offset credits from
agricultural NPSs, could significantly reduce the costs of attaining a predetermined level
of ambient quality. However, such a PS-NPS WQT program would not be suitable to all
areas, nor to all water quality issues. Trading the abatement responsibility for toxic
substances, for example, has the potential to concentrate toxic substances in the
environment around high cost abaters, and substantially increase health and
environmental risk. Distinct areas with differing water quality issues will require
individualized solutions. The purpose of this study is to rank different watershed areas in
Tennessee according to their suitability for PS-NPS WQT as a low-cost solution to the
attainment of environmental goals established by federal and state regulatory agencies.
Hypothetically, a ranking system that incorporates an index of physical and theoretical
economic relationships between NPS and PS polluters and the water quality impairments
to which they contribute should identify some areas as being particularly suitable for the
offset type WQT proposed by EPA. This study will identify and rank potentially viable
trading areas based on a series of hurdles and criteria designed to eliminate areas that
cannot support trading, and predict the suitability of trading as a solution to the water
quality problems in the remaining areas.
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Defining the Potential Market Areas
The market areas under study are commonly called watersheds, which are land
areas that drain all water that falls within them to a common point, at which the water
flows out of the watershed. Watershed boundaries follow topographical boundaries, such
as ridge lines. By this definition, each individual stream or portion thereof might be said
to have it own watershed, or drainage area. A hydrologic unit code (HUC) is a drainage
basin of one size or another, as indicated by the number of digits in its numeric code.
Successively smaller HUCs (which have successively longer numeric codes) are nested
within larger a HUC, so that the smaller HUCs flow to a central point within the larger
HUC. The largest drainage areas analyzed in this research are the eight-digit HUCs,
which are often simply called watersheds. Nested within these watersheds are their
subcomponent 12-digit HUCs, which all eventually contribute to the outflow from the
watershed in which they lie.

The Ranking Criteria
The number of river and stream miles not meeting the ambient water quality
standards to support their designated uses, hereafter referred to simply as "impaired
meters," is used both as a filter and as a ranking criterion for the purposes of WQT
suitability assessment. In a watershed where no impaired meters are attributed to a given
pollutant, there is no need to further reduce discharges of that pollutant. Since the EPA's
guidelines and the CWA do not allow increased PS discharges above the permitted level
in exchange for the purchase of credits, PSs in a watershed devoid of tradable
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impairments would have no economic incentive to purchase credits. As impaired meters
become more extensive, the need to reduce emissions of the contributory pollutant
becomes spatially (and probably quantitatively) more extensive, thus making WQT a
more viable solution.
Market participants are a must for WQT to work, and the geospatially weighted
emissions of polluters of different types are critical variables in ranking the suitability of
a given watershed as a trading area. If no regulated PSs exist in an impaired watershed,
there will be no increased regulatory pressure to spur the purchase of credits from
agricultural NPSs. The solution to such problems will lie entirely in the hands of NPS
polluters. On the other hand, in watersheds where very little agricultural activity takes
place and PS emissions are almost entirely responsible for the impairment, demand for
NPS reductions may exceed supply. Furthermore, polluters more distant from an
impairment have increasingly negligible impacts on the impairment. Thus, it is desirable
to have some range of balance between the geospatially weighted PS and NPS emissions
affecting impaired waterways. This balance need not be exactly one to one, but it should
be such that the full amount of required abatement could be accomplished (at least in
theory) by either group of polluters. This condition not only increases the likelihood that
supply will meet demand (and vice versa) but also improves the political palatability for
PSs by limiting their liability to an amount no greater than their discharge. However,
data indicating the necessary pollutant load reductions to meet ambient standards in
specific watersheds is not available, so, as a proxy for this measure, we use the ratio of
the emissions of one polluter group to the emissions of the other group. The closer the
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ratio is to one, the more likely PSs could purchase all necessary reductions from
agricultural NPSs.
Six hurdles, based on the above discussion, will be used to· narrow the target of
study by eliminating areas that are definitely unsuitable for WQT. The first three are
applied on the eight-digit HUC level to eliminate all watersheds that are unsuitable for
WQT. Then hurdles four through six (which are consecutively analogous to hurdles one
through three) are applied on the 12-digit HUC level to eliminate all unsuitable sub
watershed areas within the watershed areas that passed the first three hurdles. Hurdles
five and six are applied to aggregations of remaining 12-digit HUCs all within the same
eight-digit HUC and are linked to each other by the directional flow of water. A list of
the hurdles follows.
1. Presence oftradable impaired meters in eight-digit HUC
(tradable impaired meters > 0)
2. Presence of PS polluters in eight-digit HUC (tradable PS discharge > 0)
3. Presence of Agricultural NPS polluters in eight-digit HUC (acres of
agricultural land use > 0)
4. Contribution to tradable impairments from the 12-digit HUC (tradable
impairments affected by a 12-digit HUC within its eight-digit HUC > 0)
5. Presence of PS polluters in flow-linked aggregations of remaining 12-digit
HUCs within the same 8-digit HUC (tradable PS discharge > 0)
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6. Presence of Agricultural NPS polluters in flow-linked aggregations of
remaining 12-digit HUCs within the same 8-digit HUC (acres of
agricultural land use > 0)
The above hurdles restrict the areas under consideration to flow-linked areas containing
impairments and potential PS and agricultural NPS trading partners. Having thus
restricted the set of watersheds and portions of watersheds under study, the next step is to
rank the remaining areas that could potentially support a WQT program based on
thefollowing criteria, which are analogous to the hurdles used to find the set of potential
trading areas, with the exception of criteria 4.
1. Extent of tradable impaired meters
2. Distance-discounted PS contribution to tradable impairments
3. Distance-discounted NPS contribution to tradable impairments
4. Balance between criteria 2 and 3
While this list is not a comprehensive list of variables that might affect the
suitability of an area for WQT, it does provide insights into the basic physical criteria that
would predict a strong market. For example, established, active watershed organizations
may also have an effect on the political feasibility of a WQT program; however, their
potential effect is somewhat unpredictable, since they might choose either to legally
oppose the trading system or to facilitate transactions in the new market. To assess the
potential impacts of such human variables as watershed organizations and public opinion
would necessitate an extensive information-gathering effort through surveys of
organizations and individuals. Such an effort would be costly and premature without first
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ranking potential WQT markets based solely on physical properties as affected by the
current legal framework.

Data & Methodology

The most general set of watersheds under consideration was comprised of all
eight-digit HUCs that are either partially or completely contained by the Tennessee state
boundary. Locations of these watersheds relative to the state border were determined by
overlaying eight-digit HUC boundaries and state borders in ArcMap to begin the creation
of a geospatial information system (GIS). Only the portions of these watersheds that are
within the Tennessee boundary were considered, since the effect of involving regulatory
agencies and other stakeholders from multiple states is likely to drastically increase the
administrative and transactions costs of a WQT program. The geospatial data used in this
step may be viewed at and extracted from the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD)
Geodatabase5 , which incorporates information of various types from the US Geological
Survey and US EPA.
Application of the first hurdle to the eight-digit HUCs eliminates those that
contain no impairments attributed to nutrients, organic enrichment, or low dissolved
oxygen (hereafter referred to as "tradable impairments'l The presence of such
impairments was determined through the use of the final version of Tennessee's 2002
303(d) List (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation), which lists by
eight-digit HUC all impaired water bodies in the state, along with their respective causes.
5 Available: http://nhdgeo.usgs.gov/viewer.htm
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A geospatial shape file representing the 303(d) listed impairments was then obtained
from EPA's Watershed Assessment, Tracking & Results (WATERS) data downloads6
.

..

.

..

and added to the GIS to find the exact locations of the impairments within the eight-digit
HUCs.
Next, eight-digit HUCs containing no PS polluters with nitrogen limits were
eliminated through the initial application of the second hurdle. This hurdle eliminates
those watersheds that have no potential buyers of nitrogen credits. PS data were obtained
using EPA's Permit Compliance System (PCS)7 customized query engine, which
provides downloads of locational and discharge information for PSs in Tennessee that
emit nitrogen. The download provided coordinates for most sources that had discharge
limits for nitrogen; however, the coordinates provided were often in direct conflict with
other locational information, such as the eight-digit HU C listed in the PCS data. In
instances where such a conflict existed (or when no coordinates were reported), the
coordinates were either verified or corrected using street addresses to locate each
potentially contributing PS in its proper 12-digit HUC.
Use of the third hurdle eliminates eight-digit HUCs that contain no agricultural
NPS polluters, which would be the potential sellers of nitrogen credits. The land use data
for this study came from the 1992 National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD)8, and can be
viewed and downloaded from the USGS Seamless Data Distribution page. This dataset
was used to locate agricultural activities within their eight- and 12-digit HUCs. Areas

6

Available: http://www.epa.gov/waters/data/downloads.html
Available: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/htmVpcs/adhoc.html
8
Available: http://seamless.usgs.gov/website/seamless/viewer.php
7
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that do not pass this hurdle could not, in theory, host viable PS-NPS WQT markets
involving agricultural NPSs.
The remaining eight-digit HUCs were then subdivided into their sub-component
12-digit HUCs. Doing so allows us to account for the directional flow of water and the
approximate distance between every source and the impairment(s) to which it contributes.
The 12-digit HUCs, for the purposes of this study, are afforded a status similar to that of
the zones described by Hung and Shaw. Also, this step seemed appropriate since US
EPA and the state environmental agencies break eight-digit HUCs into their sub
component 12-digit HUCs for the purposes of creating TMDLs. 12-digit HUC
boundaries are available for download through the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
Natural Resources Conservation Service Geospatial Data Gateway9 • Next, the fourth
hurdle, based on contribution to downstream tradable impairments within the same eight
digit HUC, was applied to the sub-component 12-digit HUCs. Where downstream
impairments did not exist, those 12-digit HUCs were considered non-contributors to
water quality problems, and were eliminated from consideration. This simply means that
polluters that do not contribute to impairments within their eight-digit HUCs will not be
considered viable trading partners. The remaining 12-digit HUCs were then combined to
create sets of 12-digit HUCs, or "impairment zones," that contribute to the saine
impairment(s). Contributor status was determined for each 12-digit HUC based on
directional flow information from the NHD Geodatabase in conjunction with the
boundaries of eight- and 12-digit HUCs. There was sometimes more than one
"impairment zone" within an eight-digit HUC.
9

Available: http://datagateway.nrcs.usda.gov/NextPage.asp
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These "impairment zones" were then subjected to the fifth and sixth hurdles.
Doing so eliminates unsuitable portions of the eight-digit HUCs from consideration.
..

..

..

..

Those zones that contain no PS polluters or no NPS polluters cannot be considered viable
markets, since no trading partners would be present.
PS discharge limits from the PCS data were used as a proxy for actual emissions
because these limits are based on the design flow and technological regulatory
requirements at the facilities; therefore, the limits should be nearly the same as the
discharges. Furthermore, PSs with discharge limits are likely to be the only purchasers of
pollution credits. The discharge limits, given in pounds per day, were annualized and
summed for each 1 2-digit HUC, using the formula:

Di = Ldj * 3 6 5
jz=l

Where:
D; is total annual PS discharge within 12-digit HUC i,
� is the average daily discharge from PS polluter j, and
n is the set of all PS polluters in 12-digit HUC i.
Approximate NPS nitrogen loads were derived from a combination of land use data and
nitrogen emissions factors for different land use types as located by the NLCD, which
divides Tennessee's agricultural lands into two major types: pasture/hay and row crops.
The acreages of different land use types were multiplied by their emissions factors (23.2
lb/ac/yr and 5.53 lb/ac/yr for row crops and pasture, respectively), as determined by
Bhaduri, et al., for each 12-digit HUC. Use of the formula below returns the NPS
loadings for a 12-digit HUC:
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f

f

Li = /=I (H1 * 5.53 }+ k=l (zk * 2 3 . 2 )
Where:
L; is total annual NPS nitrogen loading for 12-digit HUC i,
Hj is the acreage of pasture featurej,
n is all pasture features inl 2-digit HUC i,
Zk is the acreage of row crop feature k, and
m is all row crop features in 12-digit HUC i.
To obtain raw, discounted NPS and PS scores for each of the 12-digit areas, the
downstream impaired meters were multiplied by a discount factor that is a function of the
number of 12-digit HUCs between the source HUC and the impairments to which it
contributes. These scores were calculated by multiplying the NPS and PS discharges by
the sum of the discounted downstream impaired meters to which they contribute as
follows:

Where:
N;, P;, L; and D; are respectively the NPS score, PS score, NPS loadings, and PS
discharges for 12-digit HUC i,
� is the length (in meters) of impairmentj,
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Xu is two plus the number of 12-digit HUCs intervening between 12-digit HUC i
and impairmentj, when impairmentj is not within 12-digit HUC i, and is equal to
one when impairmentj is within HUC i, and
n is the number of impairments to which the discharges 12-digit HUC i
contribute.
Discounting discharges by distance is appropriate for pollutants such as nitrogen because
it dissipates during in-stream transport, making more distant impacts relatively smaller
than impacts close to the source (Hung and Shaw). The result of the above process is a
distance-weighted PS and NPS emissions contribution score for each individual 12-digit
HUC.
After developing NPS and PS emissions scores for each 12-digit HUC using the
above methodology, the scores were aggregated up to the "impairment zone" level. Each
zone was assigned an NPS and a PS score, which are equal to the sums of the respective
scores for each of its sub-component, 12-digit HUCs
Thus, criteria five through six listed in the previous section were subsumed into two
factors (PS and NPS scores) to be used in developing a comparison between different
potential trading areas.
Balance between PS and NPS emissions is the third factor to be used in
developing the ranking system. To obtain a measure of this balance, the smaller of the
NPS and PS scores for each potential trading area was divided by the larger, which
returns a polluter ratio (R) between zero and one. This ratio was used to discount for the
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possibility that emissions from one type of polluter might not be substantial enough to
make PS-NPS trading feasible.
NPS and PS scores, as well as polluter ratios for each potential trading area were
then combined in a Cobb-Douglas function designed to predict an area's suitability for
WQT. The function follows:

Where:

Sj is the potential trading areaj's predicted WQT suitability score,
llj is the NPS score trading area j,

Pi is the PS score for trading area j,
Ri is the ratio of the smaller score to the larger for trading areaj, and
a, b, and c are weights that sum to 1.

The output of the function was a composite WQT suitability score (which was then
normalized between zero and 1) for each potential trading area. These scores can be
compared across the potential areas to identify areas most likely to find that PS-NPS
WQT could be part of an appropriate solution for their impairment problems.
The Cobb-Douglas functional form was chosen because of its constant returns to
scale assumption and its flexibility. The exponents can be altered to reflect various
policy choices. For example, if one desired to rank these watersheds with an NPS:PS
trading ratio of 1: 1, the exponents a and b should be equal to each other, and equal to the
exponent c by default. However, if the trading ratio is to be 2: 1, the exponent of the NPS
score should be twice that of the PS score (a=2b), making the NPS score worth more in
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the final ranking. Accounting for trading ratios in the function will change the meaning
and importance of the ranking criterion Rj. Specifically, Rj might more appropriately
equal the ratio

]½ : P; when the trading ratio is not equal to one.

The exponent c would

then be forced to equal the lesser of the exponents a and b if retention of constant returns
to scale is desirable. Furthermore, the ratio would no longer be constrained between zero
and one, since importance would be placed on which sources were discharging more of
the pollutant. It is possible that N° :Pb ratios greater than or equal to one would all be
equally desirable. Note that as the proposed trading ratio increases, the weight of R
decreases.

Results

Tennessee includes portions of 56 eight-digit HUCs. Only portions of these
watersheds within the Tennessee boundary were considered (Figure 3. 1). After applying
the first hurdle based on the presence of tradable impairments, 42 eight-digit HUCs or
portions thereof remain for consideration (Figure 3.2). Application of the PS polluter
hurdle to the 42 eight-digit HUCs eliminates another five watersheds from consideration,
leaving 37 for further analysis (Figure 3.3). The NPS hurdle is not binding, since all
remaining eight-digit HUCs contain some level of agricultural production, as shown by
the land use data.
For the next stage of analysis, the remaining eight digit HUCs were disaggregated
to their 934 subcomponent 12-digit HU Cs. Application of the fourth hurdle eliminates
those 12-digit HUCs neither containing nor contributing to a downstream tradable
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Figure 3.1 : Tennessee's 56 Watersheds
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Figure 3.2: Eight-Digit HUCs Remaining after Application of the First Hurdle
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Figure 3.3: Eight-Digit HUCs Remaining after Application of the Second Hurdle
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impairment, resulting in a set of 318 12-digit HUCs for further analysis. These 318 12digit HUCs were then grouped into 103 "impairment zones" within the 37 remaining
.

.

eight-digit HUCs (Figure 3.4). Note that several of the "impairment zones" share
boundaries, and it is possible that there may be flow linkages between some of them;
thus, the eight-digit HUC boundary may not be the most logical cutoff point for the
boundary of an impairment zone. However, eight-digit boundaries were used because of
US EPA's guidance. At this point, the fifth hurdle was applied to these zones to
eliminate those that contain no PS presence. The sixth hurdle was not binding, as all
remaining 12-digit HUCs had some agricultural production. The impairment zones were
thus whittled down to 45 potential trading areas, consisting of 239 12-digit HUCs
collectively (Figure 3.5). The Red River watershed example in Figure 3.6 provides an
example of what an eight-digit HUC that crosses the state border might look like after
application of hurdles one through six. Note that only 12-digit HUCs within Tennessee
are included in the analysis, and that this watershed has two potential trading areas.
Following the steps outlined in the methodology section produces PS and NPS
scores, as well as polluter ratios for all 239 12-digit HUCs under consideration. The
three ranking factors were then summed across each potential trading area to produce
aggregate scores for all 45 of them. Potential trading area PS and NPS scores were then
entered into the Cobb-Douglas function to produce WQT suitability scores.
The output of the process provides normalized scores for 45 potential trading areas in
Tennessee, which are plotted by score and rank in Figure 3.7. Scores for the top three
ranked potential WQT areas are between 1.00 and 0.88, and represent the entirety or a
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Figure 3.4: Tennessee's 103 Impairment Zones
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Figure 3.5: Tennessee's 45 Potential Trading Areas
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portion of the South Fork Forked Deer, Stones, and North Fork Forked Deer River
Watersheds (Figure 3.8), which do not have established TMDLs for nutrients, low
dissolved oxygen, or organic enrichment. After· this point the scores drop to around 0.47.
Eleven of the potential trading areas have score between 0.47 and 0.20, after which point
the scores fall steadily to 0.00015. The mean of all scores is approximately 0. 18 with a
standard deviation of 0.236.
Using the Cobb-Douglas formula, of course, is not the only potential way
of ranking or rating these identified potential trading areas. For example, one could use
some multi-objective ranking or rating scheme to compare the areas based on the PS and
NPS contribution to the tradable impairments. There are also other factors that are
correlated with the WQT suitability score. For example, the acreage of the potential
trading area and its suitability score have a positive correlation of 0. 722, which makes
sense because larger areas are likely to contain more tradable impairments, more
contributing PS polluters, and more contributing NPS polluters. Table 3. 1 presents each
trading area, listed by some portion of its respective eight-digit HUC, with its associated
raw scores for each of the ranking criteria, as well as the areas' associated acreages.
Table 3.2 presents the same scores converted into rankings for each watershed. Both
tables are included because 3. 1 shows the relative differences between the scores of
different trading areas, while Table 3.2 more effectively illustrates the relationship
between the ordinal rankings of the potential trading areas.
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Figure 3.8: Top Ranked Potential Trading Areas
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Table 3.1 : Tradin Areas Listed b Scores

Trading Area

08010205
05 130203
08010204
06010102
05 1 30108
06010108.08
06010207.03
06010104
05 130206
06030005
06040003.0201
05 130204
06020002. 12
06030003.0305
08010208.07
05 130202.0103
05 1 30204.06
06010207.0503
06020001 . 1 102
06030003
06040005.0403
0601 0201 .0503
06040003.03
06040002.0601
05 1 30202.0105
06040005.06
05 130106
0801 0203.0101
05 1 10002.0105
06030003.0701
06010108. 0508
05 130105
05 130108.0807
06040004.0104
05 1 30201 .0201
05 130104
08010203.0102
0601 0205 . 1 104
06010208.0405
06010206.0404
05 130204.0303
06040003.0507
05 1 10002.0503
08010209.01
05 130206.07

Overall
Raw Score
4540970
40841 95
4005445
2146959
1964290
1 775624
1585659
1 3 64263
1 327279
1269306
1096725
1087628
1081045
9 18998
726455
530693
499985
465644
445979
435463
408733
397608
385264
359454
34535 1
337698
328570
288794
262797
258993
239945
1 83730
1 82091
1 53497
1 52724
141098
1 20145
105439
93836
93401
90964
69223
58483
10646
666

Raw NPS
Raw PS
Score
Score
9676604700
37500435608
82539 1 1305
1 845 1634505
79157174093
8016342447
3 145833648
3462213816
2753015580
9 1 75887405
28129628226
2366065620
1996709220
33852 1 1 393
1 593482379
40309082767
43252023454
1 5291 26908
1430044488
12940934308
1 148541912
26202801 88
1 1 34282240
463545 1 6 1 80
1443 1 73760
1 123998871
2789 1 94746
880992900
6 1 9 1 74800
7228 1 34072
386602885 365 12937000
353538000
2375932200
3 177474 1 8
2576673000
297832477 5815563 1 560
287360640
6821 564602
261 3 12480
1 009585786
540285327
25071 6960
52 10698347
2391 32565
2 15509500
2587842020
20295 1 13 1
3943246320
1 176 1 1 36609
1 96242750
1 88339940
2148746562
1 3 13 1 77273
1 55 1 97080
1 34720208
726359409
3 1 701 55524
1 3 1 80521 6
1 17535410
1 6698 1 1969
1 863507747
78753870
27 13360649
77702328
547961485
60138468
5229288499
59684526
1 73009 1 61
5300 1 000
1325252629
4 1644800
103559366
34237800
2 1 9 1 8401 1
28744686
269815476
28544886
1 14238891
27435240
5 13021 723 .
1 82 1 3 120
14143410
584255578
541 9980370
1098504
1036409754
17203
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Balance

0.2580
0.4473
0. 1 0 1 3
0.9086
0.3000
0.0841
0.5898
0.0395
0.0354
0. 1 105
0.4383
0.0245
0.7788
0.3 1 59
0.0857
0.0106
0. 1488
0. 1 233
0.005 1
0.042 1
0.2588
0.4640
0.0459
0.0833
0.05 1 5
0.0167
0.0877
0. 1 1 82
0. 1 855
0.0416
0.0704
0.0423
0.0286
0. 1097
0.01 14
0.3063
0.03 14
0.3306
0. 1 3 1 1
0. 1058
0.2402
0.0355
0.0242
0.0002
0.0000

Acreage

481 600
600400
97920
289500
934000
1 70800
57850
503500
372500
23 1 000
32400
288200
448 10
26820
55690
30550
6 1 690
19050
39620
197 1 00
24650
23570
82330
42710
40950
93 100
45340
47930
1 1 680
35100
21010
504200
28790
23710
42730
17390
33590
45 190
39700
1 1680
1 7610
26960
10610
33580
82610

Trading Area

Overall
Rank

NPS
Rank

PS
Rank

Balance
Rank

Acreage
Rank

080 1 0205
05 1 30203
080 1 0204
060 1 0 1 02
05 1 30 1 08
060 1 0 1 08.08
0601 0207.03
060 1 0 1 04
05 1 30206
06030005
06040003.020 1
05 1 3 0204
06020002. 12
06030003.0305
080 1 0208.07
05 1 30202.0 1 03
05 1 30204.06
060 1 0207.0503
0602000 1 . 1 1 02
06030003
06040005.0403
060 1 020 1 .0503
06040003.03
06040002.060 1
05 1 30202.0 1 05
06040005.06
05 1 30 1 06
080 1 0203.0 1 0 1
05 1 1 0002.0 1 05
06030003.0701
060 1 0 1 08.0508
05 1 30 1 05
05 1 30 1 08.0807
06040004.0 1 04
05 1 3020 1 .020 1
05 1 30 1 04
080 1 0203.0 1 02
060 1 0205. 1 1 04
060 1 0208.0405
060 1 0206. 0404
05 1 30204.0303
06040003.0507
05 1 1 0002.0503
0801 0209.0 1
05 1 3 0206.07

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

5
7
1
16
10
6
17
4
3
8
21
2
29
19
11
37
23
38
39
12
31
35
15
22
42
9
24
28
32
18
26
25
20
34
14
43
27
45
41
40
44
36
33
13
30

3
4
5
7
8
10
11
12
13
15
16
17
14
18
19
2
20
9
1
21
22
23
24
25
6
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

12
5
22
1
10
25
3
33
35
19
6
38
2
8
24
42
15
17
43
31
11
4
29
26
28
40
23
18
14
32
27
30
37
20
41
9
36
7
16
21
13
34
39
44
45

5
2
12
7
1
11
17
4
6
9
31
8
22
35
18
32
16
40
27
10
36
38
15
24
25
13
20
19
43
28
39
3
33
37
23
42
29
21
26
44
41
34
45
30
14
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Conclusions
Since the scores only provide a relative ranking, the potential of any of the WQT
areas under study to actually support a viab.le WQT program is unknown. However, it
may be asserted that areas with higher scores are more suitable for WQT than areas with
lower scores. Ideally, a threshold score would be identified that would signify the
viability of a potential market area. Such a threshold value could, in theory, be identified
by comparing the scores of Tennessee's watersheds with scores for other areas that are
known supporters of viable markets, such as the various WQT pilot programs that have
met with differing degrees of success. Another potential way to discover a feasibility
threshold might be to calculate the potential abatement cost savings in each ranked
Tennessee watershed. Much could be learned about the threshold by performing a cost
savings calculation for a strategically chosen watershed, somewhere in the middle of the
ranking. Such an analysis could be performed where the required reductions to meet
ambient environmental standards are known (or have been estimated by some regulatory
agency), as would be the case in a watershed with a TMDL for nitrogen.
Theoretically, these scores should also be positively correlated with the potential
abatement cost savings for each of the possible trading areas, since the ranking process
was designed to rank the watershed areas based on their relative potential benefits from
tradable abatement responsibilities. Intuitively, then, watershed areas with higher scores
are likely to produce greater trading activity because they will likely contain more
polluters with varying cost structures, so that their marginal costs of abatement may be
equalized at positive discharge levels.
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Chapter IV
Assessing the Cost ofNPS Technology-Based Regulation

Introduction

Since the passage of the CWA, largely unregulated NPS pollution contributes to
an increasing share of the nation's water quality problems. While the amount of
agricultural land in the United States has remained relatively constant over the past 30
years, agricultural production has increased as a result of technological advances and
increasingly fertilizer-intensive agricultural practices, which have have been a major
contributor to a three-fold increase nitrate load from the Mississippi River to the Gulf of
Mexico (Greenhalgh and Sauer). When the states and territories performed a recent
survey of the nation's waters, they found that 39% of the waters assessed were impaired
for one or more uses, and EPA posits that the largest single contributor to water quality
impairments is NPS runoff from agricultural lands (US Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Water, 2002). One potential means of ameliorating the adverse effects of
modem agricultural practices would be to impose a technology-based regulation on all
agricultural producers by requiring implementation of some basic BMP to protect water
quality.
This paper is an attempt to quantify the costs of implementing a regulation that
requires that all agricultural producers create grass buffer areas of approximately 1 50 feet
between agricultural production activities and riparian features in the Harpeth River
Watershed (Figure 4. 1 ). Potential financial impacts of such a regulation are of interest
47
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Figure 4.1 : The Harpeth River Watershed in Tennessee
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with regard to WQT because the supply of riparian buffer strips will bear some
proportional relationship to the supply of agricultural NPS nutrient emissions reduction
.

.

.

credits. Of course, individual buffer strips will have differential environmental impacts
determined by, among other things, the rate of soil loss, the fertility of the soil, their
relative proximities to water quality impairments, and the land uses and practices
surrounding the buffer area.

Overview of Project Area

The Harpeth River watershed is located to the west and southwest of Nashville in
Middle Tennessee, encompassing parts of Cheatham, Davidson, Dickson, and
Williamson Counties (Figure 4. 1). The watershed drains 867 square miles through
approximately 1,364 miles of streams before eventually emptying into the Cumberland
River (US Environmental Protection Agency Region 4). The most recent land use data
for the watershed is from the 1990- 1993 Multi-Resolution Land Characteristic
Consortium, in the form of the 1992 National Land Cover Database (NLCD). Although
land use changes have certainly occurred in this rapidly-developing watershed over the
last decade, all land use data in this paper will be derived from the 1992 NLCD. At that
time, approximately 24.2%, orl 79,335 acres, were in agricultural use. Pasture/hay
accounted for 130,294 of these acres, while row crops covered the remaining 49,04 1.
The Harpeth River watershed was chosen for this project because it not only has streams
that are impaired due to "Organic Enrichment/Low DO", but more importantly, because
it is the only watershed in the state of Tennessee with a finalized TMDL for this nutrient49

related impairment (US Environmental Protection Agency Region 4). The importance of
the TMDL lies in the detailed information on sources of nutrients within the watershed
and the effects of these nutrients on water quality.

Data & Methodology

To start, the 1 992 NLCD was clipped in ArcMap to the area of the Harpeth River
Watershed. The next step was to isolate agricultural land uses from other land uses. In
the watershed, the NLCD only shows two classifications of agricultural land use, namely
"row crops" and "pasture/hay." Once these lands were located and isolated, they were
clipped based on proximity to riparian features shown in the NHD for the watershed.
This process was accomplished by creating a 150 foot buffer in ArcMap around all
riparian features, and then clipping the land use features to this buffer. ArcMap was then
used to calculate the acreage of each of these patches of agricultural land within the
buffer area. These patches were deemed to be the land put to use in buffer activities
under a potential regulatory program.
Cropland was valued at its opportunity cost, which was determined based on both
cropping practices and soil fertility. The most recent county crop acreage data from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service 1 0 were used to
estimate the crop composition in each county. The most current data available were
generally for the year 2004; however, the most recent soybean data available for
Davidson and Dickson counties were from 2001 and 2002, respectively. Com acreage
for the purposes of this study was the sum of the com for grain acreage from the
10Available:

http://www.nass.usda.gov/nass/pubs/histdata

50

aforementioned datasets and the corn for silage acreage listed for each county in the 2002
census of agriculture, since no more recent data for silage was available.
The State Soil Geographic (STATSGO) Database 1 1 , � product of the US
Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service, serves as the
measure of soil fertility for this study. The dataset divides the area into mapping units, or
areas with similar soil patterns and compositions, and also provides the proportions of the
mapping units' constituent soils. Further, the data provide estimated per acre yields for
each crop and soil type combination. A weighted average yield was obtained for each
crop and mapping unit by multiplying the yield for a given soil type by the soil's
proportion within the mapping unit divided by the sum of the proportions of all soil types
where the crop was grown, then summing these products for each crop. The above
process is summarized by the following equation:

Where:
¥;j is the weighted average yield for crop i in a mapping unit j,
Y;k is the STATSGO yield for crop i on soil type k,
Pjk is

the proportion of mapping unit j covered by soil type k, and

m is the total number of soil types on which crop i is grown in soil mapping unit j.
Each crop then had a weighted average yield for each mapping unit. These weighted
averages are assumed to be 1 994 yields, as the metadata for the STATSGO database
indicate that the data are current as of their publication date ( 1994). As a result, the yields
11

Available: http://www.ncgc.nrcs.usda.gov/products/datasets/statsgo/index.html
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needed to be inflated to current yields to reflect advances in production technology, as
well as the interaction of these advances with the changing resource base in each county,
over the last decade.
An appropriate yield inflator would be the expected 2004 yield divided by the
expected 1994 yield for each county and crop. Using expected yields is more appropriate
than using actual yields because actual yields may not reveal the same yield response to
technological change, since other factors, such as drought, may affect yields in any given
year. Furthermore, producers make decisions based on expectations, rather than actual
yields. County level data (as opposed to national data) was used for the creation of the
yield inflators in order to account for some of the regional variations and changing land
use patterns unique to the area of study. To find predicted yields, time periods were first
regressed on actual yields from the NASS downloads for each crop in each county to
estimate the values of the parameters of the equation:

Where:
Yift is the actual yield for crop i in county/in time period t,
a & P are parameters to be estimated by an ordinary least squares regression

relating time period to yield, and
t is the time period (t19s7 = 1, . . . , !2004 = 18).
The estimated parameters (a· and p•) for each crop in each county were then used to
predict yields for 12004 and 11994 using the equation:
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Where:
Yift is the predicted yield for crop i in county fin time period t,
a· &

l are parameters e·stimated by the preceding ·ordinary least squares

regressions for all crops and counties, and
t is the time period for which the yield is predicted.
The resulting regression equations and yield inflators are presented in Table 4.1 . Note
that the estimated p coefficients for some crops in some counties are negative, which may
be attributed to the changing resource base in those counties that are rapidly urbanizing.
The yield inflators (lif = Yif2ooJYif1994) were multiplied by the weighted average 1 994
yields from the STATSGO data that appertained to the respective counties and crop types
for each potential buffer feature, producing a weighted average expected current yield for
each crop on each buffer by mapping unit and county. These weighted average current
expected yields for each crop on each buffer feature by county and soil mapping unit
were produced using the formula below:

Yw = I

if

* ¥-ij

Where:
Y;..i is the weighted average current expected yield for crop i in mapping unitj in
county f,
Ji/ is the yield inflator for crop i in county f, and
¥;i is the 1994 weighted average expected yield for crop i in soil mapping unitj.
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Table 4.1 : Estimated Regressions and Yield Inflators
Equation

County

Crop

Cheatham

Com

yift = 62.52 + 3.428 t

Davidson

Com

_yift = 66. 19 + 2.502 t

Dickson

Com

Hickman

Com

Rutherford

Com

Williamson

Com

Cheatham

Soybeans

Davidson

Soybeans

Dickson

Soybeans

Hickman

Soybeans

Rutherford

Soybeans

Williamson

Soybeans

Rutherford

Cotton

yift = 62.739 + 2.811/
yift = 81.33 + 1.697 t
yift = 6 1.425 + 3. 107 /
yift = 73.98 + 2.897 t
y = 28.948 + 0.423 t
_yift = 27.431- 0. 14 1/
yift = 23.562 + 0.394 t
yift = 23.6 14 + 0.696 t
yift = 21.340 + 0.777 t
_yift = 25.353 + 0.577 f
yift = 367.29 + 18.566 /
fti
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Yield Inflator (/;fl

1.381
1.290
1.330
1. 179
1.360
1.298
1.13 1
0.947
1. 148
1.238
1.282
1. 193
1.360

Crop budgets developed by University of Tennessee Extension were consulted to
determine the return to land, management, and risk for varying crop yields. Returns were
assumed to increase (decrease) linearly with yield. For crops that had budgets for more
than one yield goal, the return predicting formulas were piecewise linear functions that
apply over distinct ranges of yield. In the case of com, for example, budgets were
available for yield goals of 120 and 150 bushels per acre. The returns are estimated by
straight lines between the expected returns at each yield goal for which a budget was
available, assuming also that the expected returns for a yield goal of zero bushels per acre
would be zero dollars. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 exemplify these functions with graphs for
com and soybeans. After estimating linear or linear piecewise functions to predict the
returns for each crop according to expected yield, each of the weighted average expected
current yields was plugged into its respective formula to obtain a weighted, per acre
return to land, management and risk for each crop on each crop buffer feature by county
and soil mapping unit. The formulas below show how returns respond to expected yield
for each crop:

lf

y * 0.45 2 3
w < 120
u; * 1 . 2 1 - 8 0 . 2 4 for fu; > 120
f
<l>u; =
<I> w = yw * I . 5 94 5 for soybeans, and
!

<l>m

=

iO

Yw * 0. 03 462 1 for cotton
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Where:
<l>w is the weighted average current expected return to land, management, and risk
for crop i on mapping unitj in countyf,

Yw is the weighted average current expected yield for crop i in county fin
mapping unitj, and
the numeric parameters are derived from UT Extension crop budgets for com, .
soybeans, and cotton.
A weighted average return per acre was then calculated for each buffer feature by
summing the products of the crop returns multiplied by their crop-mix proportions
according to the county data in the following way:

Ilo = LE
if * <l>w
i=l
Where:
Il.fi is the weighted average return per acre on mapping unitj in county f,
Eif is the p�oportion of cropland in crop i in county f,
<l>w is the weighted average current expected return to land, management and risk
from crop i in county fon mapping unit j, and
n is the total number of crops grown in countyf.
County crop proportions used to develop these weighted average returns per acre are
presented in Table 4.2. The per acre returns are the opportunity cost of the cropland, or
the expected returns that producers would forego by installing a buffer strip on the land.
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Table 4.2: Crop Proportions by County

County

Cheatham
Davidson
Dickson
Hickman
Rutherford
Williamson

Corn (%)

Soybeans (%)

29
52
67
41
34
36

Cotton (%)

71
48
33
59
51
64

58

0

·O
0
0
15

0

Agricultural land classified by the 1 992 NLCD as "pasture/hay" was all assumed
to be pasture land for the purposes of this study, since about 70% of hay in Tennessee is
.
.
.
grown for on-farm use in livestock operations, implying that many hayfields may
occasionally be used rotationally as pasture by livestock producers (US Department of
Agriculture Economic Research Service). Such being the case, fencing for stream
exclusion would be required for all land designated "pasture/hay," which may cause an
overestimation of the costs of the requirement of a vegetative buffer strip on such land,
since not all hay fields are likely to enter a grazing rotation. Costs of livestock exclusion
for grazing management are reported in US EPA's National Management Measures for
the Control ofNonpoint Pollution from Agriculture (US Environmental Protection

Agency Office of Water 2003).
The average reported cost of exclusion fencing, adjusted for inflation using the
consumer price index, was $590.09 per mile. Each potential pasture buffer polygon has a
perimeter in the ArcMap attribute table, which was used to calculate the required
exclusion fencing for each polygon. Fencing needs were calculated according to the
formulae:

Fi = Bi - 4 * 0.02 8 4 1 miles if the polygon straddled the riparian feature,
and

Fi = (Bi - 2 * 0.02 8 4 1 miles)+ 2 if the polygon lay on one side of the
water body,
Where:
F; is the number of miles of fence required for buffer feature i,
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B; is the perimeter of buffer feature i in miles, and
0.02841 mi. is the width of the buffer strip (150 ft.).
The reason for subtracting four times (two times) the buffer width from the perimeter for
fields spanning water bodies (not spanning . . . ) was the assumption that fencing already
existed between pasture and other land uses adjacent to it, so the owner need not install
fencing perpendicular to the riparian feature to achieve livestock exclusion. For pasture
polygons on only one side of a water body, the owner need only install fencing on the
pasture-side of the buffer, and not on the stream-side; therefore, the formula for buffers
not straddling a water feature includes division by two.
The number of miles of fencing needed for each potential pasture buffer was then
multiplied by the per mile cost of permanent exclusion fencing ($590.09) to obtain a total
exclusion cost for each potential buffer strip. Exclusion costs for some pasture features
within the buffer area were negative because their perimeters were less than 300 feet for
features on one side of a stream or less than 600 feet for features straddling a stream.
Features with negative exclusion costs were assumed to be land use classification errors
in the 1 992 NLCD, and were ignored in calculating costs. Eliminating these records
should have little effect on the results because their areas were all less than one tenth of
an acre, and those that were not errors are likely to be installed stream crossings for cattle
or controlled stream access for watering, which could appropriately be permitted by the
buffer regulation. The total exclusion cost for each buffer was divided by the acreage of
the buffer to obtain a per acre exclusion cost for each potential buffer according to the
following formula:
60

_ = F; * $590 . 09
E'
Ai

Where:
E; is the per acre exclusion cost for buffer feature i,
F; is the miles of fencing needed for feature i,
$590.09 is the per mile cost of permanent exclusion fencing, and
A; is the acreage of buffer feature i.
The opportunity cost of an acre of pasture was assumed to be approximately
equivalent to the average rental rate for pasture, since the average rental rate should
represent the average expected returns to land, management and risk for land owners.
The USDA lists an average 2004 per acre cash rental rate for pasture in Tennessee as
$ 19.00 (US Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service). No
attempt was made to account for varying soil fertilities among pasture lands because the
proportion of the land in different forage crops was unknown, and the average rental rate
was deemed sufficient to represent the opportunity cost of pasture.
Of course, the opportunity cost (and exclusion costs for pasture) incurred by
taking land out of production are not the only costs of vegetated riparian buffer strips.
There will also be a cost of establishment, as well as annual maintenance costs.
According to Bonham, Bosch and Pease, the average cost of an herbaceous buffer strip is
$32.79 per acre, including both the annualized establishment cost and the annual
maintenance cost. This figure applies both to acreage that is currently in pasture, as well
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as land currently in row crops. Thus, the total per acre cost of each buffer strip can be
calculated as:

Ci = ITJJ + $ 32. 79

for cropland buffers, and

Ci = $ 1 9. 00 + E; + $ 3 2. 79

for pasture buffers,

Where:
C; is the total per acre cost of buffer strip i,
II_o is the current weighted average expected per acre return from cropping in
county/in mapping unitj, where buffer feature i lies,
$ 19.00 is the expected return from the pasture land (the pasture rental rate),
E; is the per acre exclusion cost for pasture buffer i, and
$32. 79 is the annual cost of maintenance plus the annualized establishment cost.
Having estimated a per acre total cost, as well as acreage, for each potential buffer strip,
it was then possible to calculate the estimated total cost of a mandatory regulation
requiring the installation of 150 foot buffer strips on all agricultural land bordering
streams in the Harpeth River Watershed.
The total cost of this regulatory approach could be calculated at this point by
multiplying the acreage of each buffer by its total per acre cost and summing all these
products as follows:

T =L
C; * A;
i=l
Where:
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T is the total cost of mandatory 150 ft riparian buffer strips on all agricultural
land,
.

.

C; is the per acre cost of buffer feature i,
A; is the acreage of buffer feature i, and
n is the total number of potential buffer strips in the Watershed.
The next step, which should be more interesting to advocates of tradable emissions rights,
is to plot out this supply curve. Doing so entails the summation of the acreage of all
potential buffers that would be supplied at various "prices" (using $5.00 price intervals)
assuming that price equals marginal cost, or the cost of one additional acre of buffer.
This process is described mathematically by the following formula:

Where:
p is a price level that is a multiple of $5.00,
Sp is the acreage of all buffers supplied at price p,
A; is the acreage of buffer feature i, and
n is the total number of pasture and row crop features for which C; ::; p.
This calculation was performed between the lowest and the highest per acre prices of all
features to obtain a series of points on the supply schedule. Linearity is assumed between
consecutive points to calculate integrals under various points on the curve.
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Results

Clipping the 1992 NLCD agricultural land use features to the 150 foot buffer
around all NLCD riparian features in ArcMap and calculating the areas of all potential
buffer strips yielded the result that in the Harpeth River Watershed, approximately 12,605
acres, or eight percent, of agricultural land would be consumed by a regulation requiring
150 foot riparian buffer strips on all agricultural land throughout the watershed.
Approximately 8,663 acres of this potential agricultural buffer land is classified as
"pasture/hay" by the land use data. The balance of the agricultural land use (3,942 acres)
is classified as "row crops."
The STATSGO Database shows portions of 14 different soil mapping units within
the watershed, and provides the proportions of each of these mapping units covered by
each of its soil types. Yields for each crop are also provided for all soil types upon which
the crop was grown in 1994. Using these data, and the process described in the
methodology section to create weighted average yields for each crop in each soil
mapping unit provides com yields between 71 and 114 bushel per acre, soybean yields
between 31 and 4 1 bushels per acre, and cotton yields between 471 and 750 pounds per
acre.
Multiplying the yield inflators (lif) by their respective 1994 soil mapping unit
weighted average yields according to the county in which the potential buffer features lie
returns com yields ranging between 83 and 158 bushels per acre, soybean yields ranging
from 31 to 52 bushels per acre, and cotton yields ranging from 642 to 1039 pounds per
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acre. Each potential buffer strip's weighted, inflated yield was then plugged into its
respective formula to predict the expected returns from the crop on the buffer strip.
Per acre returns range from $37.80 to $ 110.44 for com, $5 1.97 to $83.06 for soybeans,
and $22.22 to $35.98 for cotton, depending on the soil mapping unit and county in which
the potential buffer strip lies.
After having estimated per acre returns for each crop on each buffer strip, the
returns for each buffer strip were weighted by crop proportions in their respective
counties so that a weighted average return to land, management and risk ( an opportunity
cost) might be obtained for each cropland riparian buffer (Table 4.3). This number is
assumed to be the per acre opportunity cost of each potential buffer. Per acre annualized
establishment and annual maintenance costs of riparian buffer strips were then added to
the opportunity costs of each buffer strip. The results are the total per acre costs of
cropland riparian buffers, and they range from $77.92 to $ 117.87, with a mean of $98.50.
The opportunity cost of pasture was assumed to be equivalent to the average rental rate
for pasture in the state of Tennessee, or $ 19.00 per acre. Fencing costs are the other
major component of buffer costs unique to pasture_ land. The formulas for calculating
fencing needs and the per mile fencing costs reported in the methodology section were
used to calculate fencing costs for each potential buffer strip. After eliminating all
potential buffer strips with negative ca�le exclusion costs, and dividing the fencing costs
of each buffer by its acreage, it was determined that the per acre exclusion costs range
from $0.02 to $299.78 for the remaining 8,576 acres of pasture that lie within the buffer
area. It should be noted here that eliminating buffer strips with negative cattle exclusion
65

Table 4.3: Weighted Average Return to Land, Management, and Risk for Cropland
County

Mapping Unit

Cheatham
Cheatham
Cheatham
Davidson
Davidson
Davidson
Davidson
Davidson
Dickson
Dickson
Dickson
Dickson
Hickman
Rutherford
Rutherford
Rutherford
Rutherford
Rutherford
Williamson
Williamson
Williamson
Williamson
Williamson
Williamson
Williamson
Williamson

TN054
TN064
TN073
TN054
TN064
TN069
TN07 1
TN072
TN048
TN054
TN060
TN073
TN060
TN054
TN062
TN064
TN067
TN076
TN054
TN060
TN062
TN064
TN066
TN067
TN069
TN07 1

Acres

Opportunity Cost ($/ac)

60.05
84.05
55.50
5 1.3 1
80.34
53.28
7 1 .75
5 1.93
57.40
55.71
53.69
52.55
89.3 1
59.6 1
56.90
84.22
55.32
52.46
60.46
57.6 1
57.5 1
85.08
64.89
55.73
66.68
75.9 1

72
34
1 73
4
101
7
6
5
26
1 93
649
36
41
1
84
44
25
23 1
93
217
1 19
877
44
328
170
362
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costs eliminated virtually all pasture features with areas less than 0.1 acre. In fact, it
seems that buffer features with areas very close to 0. 1 acre are likely to be near the ends
of the range of per acre exclusion costs, suggesting the possibility of some systematic
error, the effect of which is reduced for larger buffer areas. For each buffer feature,
opportunity cost (the rental rate) plus the exclusion fencing price were considered the
total cost of an acre of pasture. Annualized establishment costs and annual maintenance
costs for the vegetative buffer strips were then added to the exclusion and opportunity
costs, resulting in total per acre costs of pasture buffers ranging from $5 1.81 to $35 1,
with a mean of $ 1 11.97.
The cost of taking all the buffer land (including pasture and cropland) out of
production was then calculated using the formula for T mentioned under the previous
subheading, yielding the result that the total cost of a regulation requiring 150 foot
grassed riparian buffer strips on the stream edges of all agricultural fields in the Harpeth
River watershed would be approximately $ 1,318,695 annually to remove about 12,245
acres from production and establish and maintain riparian vegetation thereon. This cost
burden would clearly be distributed disproportionately among agricultural producers, as
some might even remain unaffected because their land does not border riparian features.
The supply curve was approximated by summing all the agricultural acreage that would
be offered as riparian buffers at various prices, moving through the range of per acre
costs of buffer strips at intervals of $5.00, and the supply curve is shown in Figure 4.4. If
society wanted to purchase full implementation of buffer strips, the total payment to
agricultural producers would be approximately $4,347, 195, and the buffer suppliers
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Figure 4.4: Buffer Supply Curve for the Harpeth River Watershed

68

I -+- Supply CuM j

would collectively receive $3,028,500 worth of producer surplus, assuming the law of
one price. On the other hand, because 97.9% of the buffer acreage is available at a cost
.

.

.

below $ 150.00, society could achieve almost the same level of implementation at a much
lower total cost, since the supply curve becomes nearly vertical when about 12,000 acres
of buffer strips have been purchased. The total cost to agricultural producers of installing
buffer strips on the least-cost 11,990 acres (97.9% implementation) would be
approximately $ 1,276,200. This level of voluntary implementation would require a
payment of $ 1,798,850 to agricultural buffer producers, providing them a producer
surplus of $522,650.

Conclusions

This study has presented a methodology for developing a supply curve for
agricultural riparian buffer strips, which have the potential to greatly reduce nutrient
content in agricultural runoff. This supply curve has the additional benefit of establishing
a fairly narrow price range for a riparian buffer strip, between $85 and $ 150 for about
94.9% of the potential agricultural buffer acreage. Though well-functioning markets
generally establish their own equilibrium prices and quantities, such methodology and the
predictive information it provides may be valuable in seeking to establish market-based
tradable discharge permit systems. The next step in predicting market behavior is to use
some in-depth water quality modeling to attempt to convert this buffer supply curve into
an NPS nutrient reduction credit supply curve. Further research could quantify PSs'
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marginal willingness to pay, or demand, for NPS nitrogen reduction credits in the
watershed.
There are obvious limitations to this study, many of which result from data
limitations. For example, the riparian shape files from the NHD are line features, as
opposed to polygon features, meaning that the actual interfaces between agriculturallands
and waterways are sometimes not found within a 150 foot buffer around the riparian line
features. This means that available buffer acreage may be under represented in some
areas, especially on the main stem of the Harpeth River, where the water is wide, as they
say. Yet, agricultural activities are not nearly as abundant near the main stem as they are
in the upper reaches, or eastern portion, of the Harpeth River Watershed. Thus, this data
limitation may not be as pronounced as one might expect if agricultural activities were
distributed homogenously throughout the watershed. The issue of error in stream, land
use interface identification also contributes to error in the calculation of exclusion fencing
costs for pasture land, which will depend on the shape and size of the potential buffer
feature, which are partially determined by the proximity to the riparian line features.
Ideally, data that shows the shapes and areas of all riparian features in the watershed
should be used for a study like this; however, such data are not currently available for a
sufficiently large region.
This methodology does not account for the cost of alternate watering systems for
cattle that are to be excluded from stream access. These costs ought to be included, as
they would be incurred as a direct result of complete cattle exclusion; however, in order
to calculate such costs, we would need to know how many cattle are on how much
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pasture, as well as which elements of the "pasture/hay" land use classification are
actually pasture, as opposed to hay.
.

.
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Additionally, farmers who establish buffer strips are also likely to modify
practices elsewhere in their operations. These modifications may have adverse results or
provide unexpected benefits for society as a whole. This study does not account for the
private benefits to agricultural producers brought about as a result of reduced erosion and
increased stream bank stability provided by buffer strips. These private benefits,
inasmuch as agricultural producers believe they exist, will reduce their perceived
opportunity costs, thus reducing the total cost of any given level of buffer strip
implementation below those described by the supply schedule. To assess these potential
private benefits, extensive in situ work and modeling would need to be performed so that
the reduced effects of erosion could be estimated and monetized for each potential buffer
strip. Such modeling could also be used estimate the differential environmental impacts
of buffer strip implementation on distinctive potential buffer strips. This information
could be used to develop a supply curve for nitrogen reduction credits from NPSs.
However, the supply of agricultural riparian buffer strip will change substantially
with the passage of time, especially in a rapidly developing area like the Harpeth River
Watershed, which is home to Nashville and its various extensions, which are rapidly
expanding. Thus, the potential for agricultural NPS reductions changes as land use
changes. In this particular watershed, as in most, NPS remains the major source of
nutrient loadings, however, an increasing proportion of these loadings is coming from
urban and suburban land, as agricultural land is being converted to new uses. These
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situations are not static, and equilibrium for a market in buffer strips will be constantly
changing in watersheds that are rapidly developing.
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Chapter V
Summary & Conclusion

WQT may be an important part of a cost-effective solution to persistent water
quality impairments caused by nutrients and other oxygen demanding pollutants in some
watersheds, though PSs-PSs trading may not be viable at all in other areas. The Question
to answer prior to attempting the establishment of such a program is whether balanced
supply and demand for nutrient credits will exist in a potential market area. Chapter III
of this thesis lays out a methodology that results in PS-NPS WQT scores for the various
potential trading regions of Tennessee, which are defined within eight-digit HUC
boundaries by the flow of water across 12-digit HUC boundaries. These potential trading
areas are ranked based on the relative nitrogen contributions from PSs and NPSs to their
water quality impairments. These relative loads are based on measures of the extent of
loadings at the source and the distance of the source from the impairments. Three
potential trading areas (South Fork Forked Deer, Stones, and North Fork Forked Deer
River Watersheds) scored well above the rest, suggesting that these three watersheds
merit particular attention to the potential for WQT to assist in reducing the cost of
compliance with ambient environmental water quality standards. It would be prudent to
assess these areas in greater detail with regard to their suitability for WQT in conjunction
with the development of nutrient, organic enrichment, and low dissolved oxygen TMDLs
for their water bodies.
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Chapter IV presents the methodology and results of a process designed to
approximate a supply curve for agricultural riparian grassed buffer strips for the Harpeth
· River Watershed in Middle Tennessee. Unfortunately, the process does not directly
assess the supply of NPS nitrogen credit reductions from agriculture, but the derived
supply curve bears some relationship to that for nitrogen reduction credits.
The papers that comprise this thesis have the potential to improve the prospects
for cost-effectively achieving the environmental quality standards that government
agencies have set. If WQT has a· place in the solution, this work has identified some
targets for future study.
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